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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

OPCW Team Visits Libya

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 5 February 2004, www.opcw.org.

As of 5 February 2004, the Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force in Libya. In response to the Libyan Government's request for technical support, a team of experts from the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) led by OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfrter is now working closely with senior Libyan Government officials in Tripoli to ensure the effective and comprehensive implementation of the chemical weapons ban. Mr Pfrter met with the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, H.E. Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, who emphasized in his discussion with Mr Pfrter that "Libya is committed to the full and effective implementation of the Convention on Libyan territory. Libya intends to comply with this Convention in the spirit of complete transparency." OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfrter reiterated in his discussion with H.E. Mr Shalgam the Organisation's active support for Libya's "farsighted and courageous decision to join the international community in upholding the ban on chemical weapons. All of the OPCW's Member States are committed to the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under the Organisation's international verification." On behalf of the Organisation's Member States, OPCW Director General Pfrter extended to the Libyan Government "the congratulations of all Member States for this decision, which significantly enhances international peace and security. Libya's elimination of these weapons under international verification should serve as an example to all States that have not yet joined the Convention to follow suit without delay." An initial round of technical discussions was held between Libyan Government officials from the relevant agencies, dealing with chemical weapons-related matters, and the OPCW's experts, during which an initial assessment of the chemical weapons stockpiles and related aspects of their program was provided. The Libyan authorities informed OPCW Director General Pfrter that a National Committee for cooperation and liaison with the OPCW has been formed to coordinate the Libyan Government's efforts to meet its Convention-related obligations, including submitting an initial declaration of all chemical weapons and production capability and to establish procedures to facilitate OPCW inspections.





Russia Sets Chemical Disarmament Priorities for 2004

ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID CEP200402000263.

The State Commission on Chemical Disarmament in Russia determined the priorities in financing the destruction of toxic agents in 2004 at its meeting today. The director-general of the Russian Munitions Agency, Col-Gen Viktor Kholstov, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that "the first of these priorities is the allocation of funds to provide antiterrorist equipment to ensure that the storage and destruction of chemical weapons is secure". "The second important priority", the general noted, "is recognized as providing a reliably functioning facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the village of Gornyy in Saratov Region and the safe destruction in it of the planned volumes of toxic agents. The stocks of mustard gas have been destroyed there, and the detoxification of lewisite is under way. The whole of this arsenal (1,160 t) is scheduled to be destroyed by 2005. Viktor Kholstov particularly stressed that the "main funds will be allocated from the federal budget for the implementation of the purpose-orientated programme 'The Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation'" in 2004. He noted that R18bn less than planned had been channelled into its implementation over the last four years. "Foreign aid will play an important, but secondary part here," he stressed. "At the present time, 14 countries and the European Union are providing this assistance. Poland, the Czech Republic and other states have expressed a willingness to take part in the chemical weapons disarmament of Russia."

Russia: No Dangerous Leaks Found at CW Disposal Plant

ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID CEP20040204000191.

The Russian Ministry of the Environment has not found dangerous leakages at the chemical weapon disposal plant in Gorny, Saratov region. "It was established during the inspection that there are no such dangerous toxic substances as yperite, monoethanolamin, and lewisite in the ponds, and in their content in the atmosphere does not exceed half of the maximum permissible concentration," the ministry told Itar-Tass on Wednesday. No hazardous substances were found in the underground water either. The condition of the flora and fauna in the area around the plant is normal and "has not changed since 2002", the ministry said. Ecological monitoring in the area was conducted by two laboratories accredited by the State Committee for Standardisation. The monitoring was conducted on the plant's grounds and in the residential areas. About 3 percent (1,160 tonnes) of Russia's 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons are stored at Gorny. At the end of last year, the plant destroyed all stocks of yperite and began scrapping lewisite. The plant hopes to finish the process before 2005. Russia has to destroy all of its chemical weapons by 2012.

Russian Experts Funding of CW Disposal Less than Promised

Interfax, Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Moscow), 4 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID CEP20040204000144.

Although the number of countries assisting Russia in chemical disarmament increased to 14 over the past few years, the amount of financing they provide is considerably less than what they promised, an expert said. "We have to look at the realities of the day. For example, existing intergovernmental agreements state that by today, (the donor countries - Interfax-AVN) should have allocated up to USD1.9bn, but, in fact, the amount of financing received since 1992 is a little over USD286m," the Director General of the Russian Munitions Agency, Viktor Kholstov, reported at a State Commission on Chemical Disarmament meeting on Wednesday. Kholstov said that "the intensity of the financing does not comply with the actual demands of the Russian chemical disarmament program." The state commission decided to analyze the financial support to Russia for chemical disarmament and develop a system of measures aimed at raising additional off-budget finances for the chemical disarmament program before March 15.





Lewisite Destruction Resumed in Saratov Region

Anatoly Yurkin, *ITAR-TASS (Moscow)*, 2 February 2004; accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

The detoxication of lewisite was resumed at the technological complex for the destruction of chemical weapons in Saratov Region. "The lewisite line was on a maintenance service for several weeks after its experimental start late in December, last year, when 13 tons of lewisite were destroyed," Itar-Tass learned from Alexander Kharichev, adviser to Sergei Kiriyeenko, who is official representative of the President in the Volga Federal District and chairman of the state commission for chemical disarmament. "The putting in operation of the technological line will be of much importance, because Russian technologies for the destruction of lewisite are tested and perfected on it. The optimal technology has been chosen, which will be used in the city of Kambarka, the Republic of Udmurtia. 6,360 tons of Lewisite are stored there, which, according to the plan, are to be destroyed after 2005," Kharichev said. In the opinion of Viktor Petrunin, Doctor of Chemistry, Director-General of the National Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technologies, "the technologies developed in Russia have been recognized as the best in the world, because they are economical and ecologically safe." "Large amounts of lewisite and the mixture of lewisite and mustard gas are kept at Russian storage facilities. Russian scientists have developed the technologies, which are unique in the world, for the purpose of their destruction," he told Itar-Tass. Russia will destroy 20 per cent out of some 40,000 tons of toxic agents, kept in its arsenals, before 2005. All the chemical weapons are planned to be destroyed by 2012, including the recultivation of land and its turning over to local government bodies.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force in Libya

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2 February 2004, www.opcw.org.

Libya announced its renunciation of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, on 18 December 2003. Subsequently, the Libyan Government deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the United Nations on 6 January 2004. As foreseen by the Convention, thirty days later, on 5 February 2004, the CWC will enter into force for Libya and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be legally empowered on that day to begin the on-site verification of Libya's compliance with the chemical weapons ban. From 5 February 2004, Libya will begin to meet in full its obligations under this international disarmament and nonproliferation treaty. In response to the Libyan Government's request for technical support, an OPCW team of experts will be working closely with Libyan officials to ensure the effective and comprehensive implementation of the chemical weapons ban. As foreseen by the CWC, Libya's obligations under the Convention include: establishing a National Authority and points of entry to facilitate, among other administrative duties, the requisite chemical weapons-related & industrial inspections; drafting and enacting national legislation to implement the Convention and make any breach of the Convention committed on the territory of Libya or by a Libyan national a crime punishable under domestic law.

The OPCW's international inspectors will be verifying on-site Libya's compliance with the CWC's disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, including:

- ° Verifying Libya's comprehensive initial declaration of any chemical weapons, past and present chemical weapons-related activities, as well as of any industrial activities or sites, subject to reporting;
- ° Inactivating, and subsequently eliminating any chemical weapons production capacity;
- ° Securing any chemical weapons prior to their destruction;
- ° Destroying any chemical weapons;
- ° Ensuring the non-diversion of chemicals for activities prohibited under the Convention, as well as reporting any transfers and abiding by transfer restrictions of CWC-listed chemicals.

The OPCW welcomes Libya's sovereign and voluntary decision to join the other 158 States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention as a positive step that significantly enhances its own national, as well regional and collective security. Libya will enjoy as a Member State of the OPCW the collective protection against chemical weapons afforded by the Convention. OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfrter commented upon the expected entry into force of the Convention in Libya, noting, "Libya's historic initiative is a decision of signal importance, which, hopefully, will serve to guide and encourage other States to follow suit. The OPCW stands ready to provide any assistance and support necessary to ensure that the chemical weapons ban is fully implemented in Libya and globally. This treaty benefits all States and this Organisation will spare no effort to include every State under its protection."





Russia to Allocate Funds for Chemical Weapons Disposal Facility

Interfax (Moscow), 30 January 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID CEP20040130000070.

In 2004, 2.7 billion rubles will be allocated to build a chemical weapons disposal facility in Kambarka, Udmurtia, as part of the Russian chemical weapons disposal program. Russian Ammunition Agency director Viktor Kholstov, President of Udmurtia Alexander Volkov, the heads of the republic's ministries and departments and representatives of construction and design organizations were present at a conference in Kambarka where the government's plans were announced. A source in the republic's government told Interfax it will cost approximately 6 billion rubles to build the chemical weapons disposal facility. It is planned to finish building the plant by the end of 2005, and in 2006, disposal of lewisite will begin. Kambarka's infrastructure will also be developed. This year, 260 million rubles will be transferred from the budget to the town for housing and social facility construction and gas supply. "Besides convincing the Russian prime minister that it is necessary to finance the town's social facilities, we managed to raise the amount of financing by almost 300 million rubles. This makes the social side of the project quite considerable," said Udmurtia's president. Following the meeting, a list of social facilities that will receive budget financing was approved. Some 300 million rubles will be spent on renovating boiler houses and linking homes to gas lines. Road building and restoration will take up 100 million rubles. In addition, three schools and a central district hospital will be restored and re-equipped. Ecological issues will be considered while building the plant, Kholstov said. This is the main task the builders are facing, he noted. Kholstov said that all necessary measures are being taken to ensure the ecological safety of the lewisite storage. He said that a monitoring system that had been developed over several years will eventually be installed at the new disposal facility. There are about 15,000 tons of chemical weapons stored at the Kambarka and Kizner arsenals in Udmurtia. The total amount of chemical weapons in Russia amounts to about 40,000 tons.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY (CFE)

Moscow Again Raises Issue of Conventional Forces Treaty

Baltic News Service, 5 February 2004; accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

Russia could accept the establishment of bases in Bulgaria and Romania but considers locations such as Poland, Slovenia or the Baltic countries totally senseless in terms of international operations against terror, a senior representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Moscow is worried that several countries about to join NATO have not acceded to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and therefore the upper limits of forces do not apply if U.S. military bases are set up in their territories, Interfax reported an unidentified defense official as saying. "Form the legal point of view those countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, may any time set up a big NATO military base in their countries," the Russian defense official said in a comment on the seven countries' imminent accession to the North Atlantic alliance. He underlined that the above four countries had not acceded to the CFE Treaty. The defense official said the Russian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov was planning to take up the issue at the security conference to open in Munich on Saturday. "We want to be certain that on NATO's eastward enlargement Russia does not come into a situation where it is surrounded by NATO bases," the official said. "The Russian stance is analogous with the construction of NATO and U.S. military facilities in CIS countries, which Russia regards as a special zone of its national security," the source said. "We are understandably worried by the military presence of any third countries in the territory of CIS." He said it was impossible to justify such activity by international fight against terrorism. The Defense Ministry official said Russia was worried by the opportunity that gray zones beyond the control of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe would be created as a result of NATO's eastward expansion. It is an aspiration for Moscow to see the NATO accession countries acceding to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty signed in 1990 on the initiative of the then Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The treaty, renewed in 1999, sets limits to five types of conventional weapons -- tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and helicopters in European regions. The treaty, of which also the former Soviet Union was a signatory, was a closed one. Other countries may accede to the renewed version of the treaty, and this is what Russia is demanding from its neighbors. A spokesman for the Estonian Foreign Ministry told BNS that Estonia does want to accede to the treaty, but the 1990 treaty is not open to others. Other countries can accede to the so-called adapted treaty of 1999, but only after it has taken effect. However, this will happen only after all the thirty countries that signed it have also ratified it, but they have not done it yet, the Estonian Foreign Ministry spokesman said.





NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

UN Nuclear Watchdog to Persist in Inquiry Despite Pakistani Refusals

Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse, 6 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID

EUP20040206000322, "IAEA 'Intensely Interested' in Pakistan's Black Market Nuclear Trading."

The UN atomic watchdog insisted Friday [6 February] that its investigation into Pakistani-led black market nuclear trading was on track despite Islamabad's refusal to reveal documents or allow inspections of its facilities. "We are intensely interested in this black market because it impacts on our ability to complete our work in Iran and Libya," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spokesman Mark Gwozdecky told AFP. He was speaking after Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf Thursday rejected demands for an independent investigation, sharing of documents with the IAEA or opening of nuclear installations to UN inspections. This followed revelations by the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he had shared sensitive nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea for more than a decade. "This is a sovereign country, no documents will be submitted to the IAEA, to an independent inquiry and we will not allow UN to supervise our nuclear" program, Musharraf said. But IAEA officials would be welcome to visit and Pakistan would discuss with them the results of its own investigation, he said. Pakistan is a member of the IAEA but not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which empowers the agency to monitor worldwide compliance with nuclear safeguards. "We have to look at the statute to see if there's the expectation that other member states would cooperate with the agency with its safeguards elsewhere," a Western diplomat at the IAEA said. [Click here for full text.](#)

IAEA Inspectors in Libya Making Progress

International Atomic Energy Agency, 28 January 2004, www.iaea.org

IAEA inspectors have been making rapid and steady progress in their nuclear verification efforts in Libya. They have benefited from a high level of cooperation from the Libyan authorities. In a note to its Member States today, the IAEA said that inspectors have just completed the initial phase of their work, which included conducting an inventory of sensitive nuclear components and materials, the application of IAEA seals and working with U.S. and UK personnel who, with the agreement of the Libyan authorities, provided logistical support to remove these materials from the country. Sensitive items have been removed under IAEA supervision and remain under IAEA seal and oversight. The IAEA is grateful for the support provided by these countries. A team of IAEA inspectors, including centrifuge and weaponization experts, remain in Libya continuing their work. In the coming weeks, IAEA inspectors will be undertaking verification work on nuclear components, equipment and materials inside Libya and on items which have been removed.

OTTAWA CONVENTION

Romania to Scrap Antipersonnel Mines by End March 2004

MediaFax (Bucharest), 2 February 2004; accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

Romania will conclude the process of destroying the stocks of antipersonnel mines (1m mines) in March, one year before the deadline established by the Ottawa Convention, announced the general director of MAE (Foreign Affairs Ministry), Mihnea Constantinescu. Mihnea Constantinescu said that this process was also concluded before the deadline established by the convention in states like Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. Romania signed the convention on banning the use, stocking, production, transfer of antipersonnel mines and their destroying on 3 December 1997. Romania participated, even before becoming a member of the Ottawa Convention, in missions of maintaining peace under the care of UN and NATO in Albania, Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and medical assistance for the victims of antipersonnel mines in Angola, Somalia and Kuwait, said Constantinescu. According to a report of the convention regarding the survivors of explosions of antipersonnel mines, in Southeastern Europe, the number of victims reaches 6,081 persons, while the number of dead persons is 1,527. Most of the injured persons (3,873) and dead persons (928) registered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Croatia (1,373 survivors and 414 injured persons), Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro. Only 18 per cent of the survivors are in a good physical and psychic condition, 82 per cent still need medical support. The convention on banning the use, stocking, production, transfer of antipersonnel mines and their destroying was enacted at Oslo, in September 1997 and came into force at the reunion from Ottawa, on 1 March 1999. So far, the number of countries that participate to the convention reached 141. The convention supports the decision of the member states to end the number of victims caused by antipersonnel mines. Before 23 January 2004, were destroyed 31m antipersonnel mines





from 115 states. Around 50 states have mined fields that they have to clean in ten years from the implementation of the convention in each country. Approximately 20 states in the world have a large number of victims, to whom they have to grant assistance for rehabilitation and reintegration in society, with international financial support. An important role in helping the victims was the international organizations and NGOs in each country. From the implementation of the convention 1.6bn dollars were assigned at global level. In November 2004, at Nairobi (Kenya), the first conference for evaluating the level of application of the provisions of the convention will take place, five years since its implementation.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION TREATY (SORT)

Russian General 'Certain' of U.S. Implementation of SORT

Interfax (Moscow), 3 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID CEP20040203000163.

Russia's military leadership is certain the Russian-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) will be fully implemented. "There are no preconditions for revising the document. The treaty clearly stipulates the parties' obligations, and I believe our American colleagues and we should strictly follow its provisions," First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky told Interfax on Tuesday. The reduction of strategic offensive weapons is advantageous to both Russia and the U.S., Baluyevsky said. "I am simply sure that neither Russia nor America need this many nuclear warheads," he said. To abide by the treaty, Russia is cutting strategic offensive armaments whose service lives have expired, Baluyevsky said. "Our American colleagues are acting in a similar way," the general said. Russia and America are currently carrying out mutual inspections of their strategic offensive reductions in line with the START-1 provisions, Baluyevsky said. "At least until 2009, we will inspect each other's implementation of the two treaties using the provisions of START- 1," he said. Asked if Russia can maintain nuclear parity with the U.S. in the future, Baluyevsky said, "I believe each side perfectly understands that quantity absolutely does not matter now. What counts most now is each side's ability to guarantee their security." "We believe that our activity in building and developing the nuclear component of the armed forces will ensure security for our state in the near, mid, and long term," he said. Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The main obligation of the parties is their commitment to reduce strategic offensive weapons to 1,700-2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in March 2003, and the State Duma did so on May 14, 2003.

U.S.-IAEA ADDITIONAL MODEL PROTOCOL

DOE, U.S. Companies to Report More Nuclear Activities to IAEA

George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, 4 February 2004; accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

The Bush administration, moving to comply with a new international nonproliferation initiative, is preparing an implementation plan under which most major Energy Department sites and hundreds of commercial nuclear operations will report a wide range of nuclear research, fuel production, equipment manufacturing and waste processing activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency for review and possible inspection, DOE and Commerce Department officials said last week. In testimony Thursday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, DOE and Commerce Department officials outlined the impact of the so-called "additional protocol" to the United States' current inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They also urged prompt Senate ratification of the new protocol, saying U.S. implementation was vital to encouraging other nations to agree to the same expanded nuclear review regime. [Click here for full text.](#)





UN Nuclear Watchdog to Persist in Inquiry Despite Pakistani Refusals

Michael Adler, Agence France-Presse, 6 February 2004; in FBIS, FBIS Document ID EUP20040206000322, "IAEA 'Intensely Interested' in Pakistan's Black Market Nuclear Trading."

The UN atomic watchdog insisted Friday [6 February] that its investigation into Pakistani-led black market nuclear trading was on track despite Islamabad's refusal to reveal documents or allow inspections of its facilities.

"We are intensely interested in this black market because it impacts on our ability to complete our work in Iran and Libya," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spokesman Mark Gwozdecky told AFP.

He was speaking after Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf Thursday rejected demands for an independent investigation, sharing of documents with the IAEA or opening of nuclear installations to UN inspections.

This followed revelations by the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, that he had shared sensitive nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea for more than a decade.

"This is a sovereign country, no documents will be submitted to the IAEA, to an independent inquiry and we will not allow UN to supervise our nuclear" program, Musharraf said.

But IAEA officials would be welcome to visit and Pakistan would discuss with them the results of its own investigation, he said.

Pakistan is a member of the IAEA but not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which empowers the agency to monitor worldwide compliance with nuclear safeguards.

"We have to look at the statute to see if there's the expectation that other member states would cooperate with the agency with its safeguards elsewhere," a Western diplomat at the IAEA said.

He said that if Pakistan was part of the global black market, "then it would behoove them to fix some of the damage they've done."

The revelations from Khan are just the "tip of an iceberg" about such illegal trafficking, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Thursday.

"We need to follow this through. We need to know who was producing centrifuges" that can be used to make highly enriched uranium for atomic bombs.

He said Pakistan has been "quite cooperative so far" with the IAEA.

But a Western diplomat close to the IAEA said the agency had not asked Pakistan if it could interview Khan.

He said the political situation there was too sensitive. "The IAEA doesn't want Musharraf to fall. That would be the worst thing that could happen," he said.





The IAEA had set off the Khan scandal when it alerted Pakistan last year that Iran had blueprints for centrifuges that were similar to ones Pakistan had used in building the bomb and which Khan acquired when he worked in the Netherlands in the 1970s.

But a diplomat said nothing would have happened without US pressure on Pakistan to come clean on Khan.

"The United States put so much pressure on them. If it were just the IAEA, forget it, they couldn't do a thing," the diplomat said.

Analyst Jon Wolfsthal, who works in Washington's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in Vienna: "The idea that this is the end of the story is impossible to accept."

ElBaradei had said individuals in at least five countries were involved in trafficking that went back at least to the 1980s.

The two countries besides North Korea, Libya and Iran were Malaysia and Dubai, Wolfsthal said.

Malaysia was a source of making parts for centrifuges. "They do manufacturing knock-off's quite well," said Wolfstahl about Malaysia's industrial capabilities.

Dubai on the other hand was a source for middlemen for the trafficking.

Wolfstahl said other countries involved might be Saudi Arabia, which in the 1980's bought long-range missiles from China, the Iraq of fallen dictator Saddam Husayn and maybe even Syria.

Saudi Arabia, said Wolfstahl, is concerned over Iran, which has been acquiring both nuclear and missile technology.

He said Syria was an unlikely candidate, however, for nuclear proliferation since it was mainly interested in chemical and biological weapons.

Meanwhile, "Khan probably did more with Iran than Iran has admitted," Wolfstahl said, referring to weapons design blueprints such as were found in Libya but not yet in Iran.

If such documents showed up, they could be the "smoking gun" for the IAEA to see Iran has failed to comply with international nuclear safeguards and take the issue to the UN Security Council, which could then impose punishing sanctions on Tehran.





DOE, U.S. Companies to Report More Nuclear Activities to IAEA

George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, 4 February 2004; accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

The Bush administration, moving to comply with a new international nonproliferation initiative, is preparing an implementation plan under which most major Energy Department sites and hundreds of commercial nuclear operations will report a wide range of nuclear research, fuel production, equipment manufacturing and waste processing activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency for review and possible inspection, DOE and Commerce Department officials said last week.

In testimony Thursday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, DOE and Commerce Department officials outlined the impact of the so-called "additional protocol" to the United States' current inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

They also urged prompt Senate ratification of the new protocol, saying U.S. implementation was vital to encouraging other nations to agree to the same expanded nuclear review regime.

The officials said the importance of the additional protocol was underlined by recent revelations about Iran's and Libya's clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment and other nuclear activities portrayed as commercial and civilian operations.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) expressed strong support for the new protocol and wondered aloud "whether we would have been able to detect and stop Iran's and Libya's clandestine programs long before now had additional protocols been in force in those countries."

Lugar said the Iran and Libya revelations showed that the IAEA's current inspection program did not throw a wide enough net to detect countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

"Over time, we have learned that existing safeguards agreements have been circumvented by determined cheaters," he said. "The additional protocol seeks to fill holes in the existing patchwork of declarations and inspections. It will require the declaration of many locations and activities to the IAEA not previously required, and allow, with less than 24 hours notice, inspections of such locations."

The Bush administration's support for the additional protocol is part of a long effort by U.S. officials to persuade other countries to expand proliferation controls, said Linton Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within DOE that runs the nuclear weapons complex.

Brooks said the United States played a key role in developing the additional protocol concept in the mid-1990s after Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program was uncovered in the wake of the Gulf War.

And he said U.S. implementation of the expanded nuclear inspection regime was critical if other countries were to agree to the same kind of program.

"One can only ponder the possible impact of failing to ratify the U.S. additional protocol...on the effort to get Iran and other countries of concern to implement their own additional protocols," Brooks said in his formal statement to the committee.





Brooks said the additional protocol program promised to help the IAEA discover worrisome nuclear activities at the earliest stage possible.

"By broadening the verification role of the IAEA to include fuel cycle R&D and related manufacturing not involving nuclear materials, as well as imports and exports of sensitive nuclear equipment, the additional protocol advances the stage at which the IAEA can detect undeclared activities," he said.

Within DOE, Brooks said U.S. implementation of the additional protocol would expand IAEA oversight well beyond the three department sites now inspected by the United Nations watchdog agency, which currently conducts monthly checks of high-enriched uranium and plutonium stored at the Hanford site in Washington, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Y-12 plant in Tennessee.

Brooks said "nearly all" the major DOE laboratories and facilities will declare activities to the IAEA under the additional protocol. He estimated the number of operations to be disclosed would be in the hundreds, and that most of those declarations would be in the area of civil nuclear fuel cycle research not involving nuclear materials and manufacture or export of sensitive items, such as equipment to maintain nuclear reactors or uranium enrichment facilities.

As for any security concerns raised by broadened IAEA oversight, Brooks noted the new protocol gave DOE ample authority to exclude from IAEA review any programs deemed sensitive to national security. He said commercially sensitive programs also could be excluded.

And he said he expected the IAEA would carry out inspections of DOE sites under the additional protocol only under "rare circumstances," and only after the United States was given an opportunity to answer questions about a declared activity.

Brooks estimated the overall cost of initial compliance with the additional protocol would be \$10 million for DOE field sites and \$3.5 million for DOE headquarters, with annual costs thereafter pegged at about \$1.3 million.

In regard to expanded IAEA review of commercial nuclear activities, a Commerce Department official said that agency's Bureau of Industry and Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would help affected U.S. companies comply with the additional protocol. NRC will be responsible for its licensees and Commerce will handle commercial activities not licensed by NRC, including uranium mining, research and development not involving nuclear materials and manufacturing and importing of specially designed nuclear equipment.

Peter Lichtenbaum, assistant secretary of Commerce for export administration, estimated that no more than 500 commercial operations outside of NRC jurisdiction will be required to report activities to the IAEA.

As with DOE, commercial operations deemed sensitive to national security can be excluded and Lichtenbaum said he expected "no more than a few" IAEA inspections of company sites each year.

To protect against any domestic disclosure of commercially sensitive activities, Lichtenbaum asked Congress to consider adding a statutory exemption to the Freedom of Information Act for information provided by companies to the commercial reporting system being developed by Commerce for compliance with the additional protocol.

